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Hennessey: Agency Law: Extending the Common Knowledge Doctrine

CASE COMMENT
AGENCY LAW: EXTENDING THE COMMON
KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1995)
William T. Hennessey*
Respondent was assaulted by an employee1 at a gasoline station
owned by petitioner but leased to a franchisee.2 He filed suit against
petitioner arguing that petitioner had effectively established an apparent
agency relationship3 with the franchisee station operator.4 As proof that
petitioner had represented the station as its agent, respondent alleged
that petitioner's products were sold in the station, that its trademarks and
logos were used throughout the station,5 and that the station's employees were required to wear uniforms bearing petitioner's corporate
logos.6 The trial court granted petitioner's motion for summary
judgment,7 holding that respondent had failed to offer facts sufficient
* This Comment is dedicated to my dearest friend, Cathy, for her constant love, support,
and understanding, and to my loving parents for always encouraging me to pursue excellence.
I. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1995). The employee pled
nolo contendere to criminal charges and was sentenced to one year probation. Id. at 122 (Shaw,
J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 120.
3. Actual agency, whether express or implied, is a consensual relationship. HAROLD G.
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 12 (2d ed.
1990). An actual agency relationship is created "only when one person manifests an intention
that another shall act in his behalf and the other person consents to represent him." Id. In
contrast, an apparent agency relationship can be created simply by representing to third persons
that another is his agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1957). No
consensual relationship is necessary. See id. Although apparent agency is "entirely distinct" from
actual agency, the power to deal with third persons and the liability which results therefrom may
be identical. Id.
4. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120. Respondent's complaint alleged that petitioner was
negligent for failing to provide adequate security at the station and for failing to remedy a
foreseeable danger. Bransford v. Berman, 601 So. 2d 1306, 1307 (4th DCA 1992), quashed sub
nom., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1995). Respondent also filed suit
against the franchisee. Id.
5. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120.
6. Id. at 122 (Shaw, J., dissenting). The employee was wearing a uniform and hat bearing
petitioner's logo and corporate name when he assaulted respondent. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 120. Petitioner contended that respondent had failed to allege facts sufficient to
support a claim of apparent agency. Id. at 120-21. The pertinent rule provides:
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to support a claim of apparent agency.8 Reversing the trial court, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that petitioner might be liable
under a theory of apparent agency because petitioner owned the station
property and prominently displayed its signs and logos there to induce
customers to patronize the station. 9 The Florida Supreme Court granted
review," and in reversing the decision of the district court, HELD, that
respondent failed to allege the level of representation necessary to create
an apparent agency relationship."
Traditionally, courts have applied the master-servant analysis of
agency law to determine if a franchisor could be held liable for the acts
of a franchisee. 2 However, the widespread growth of advertising and

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
8. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120.
9. Berman, 601 So. 2d at 1307. The district court held that petitioner might be liable for
failing to provide adequate security and for failing to remedy a foreseeable danger. Id. The
district court stated that it was aware of an earlier case, Sydenham v. Santiago, 392 So. 2d 357
(Fla. 4th DCA 1981), "which might lead to a contrary result." Id. However, the court
distinguished Sydenham because in that case the oil company neither owned nor controlled the
station. Id. Writing separately from the court, Judge Stone argued that Holiday Inns, Inc. v.
Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (4th DCA 1991), did not extend liability to franchisors simply
because the franchisor contracted with a truly independent contractor for use of its signs, logo,
uniforms, products, or method of operating. Id. (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
10. Bransford,648 So. 2d at 120. The court based review on an apparent conflict between
Berman and Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983). Id. The court
claimed jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Id.
11. Id. at 120-21. The instant court retreated from its holding in Orlando Executive Park
to the extent that case suggested that logos or other trademark symbols alone can create an
apparent agency relationship. Id. at 121.
12. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 provides:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent
agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were
such.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957).

In Mercury Cab Owners' Assn. v. Jones, 79 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1955), the Florida Supreme
Court applied § 267 of the Restatement (First) of Agency. The language of § 267 of the
Restatement (First) is identical to that of the Restatement (Second). For a discussion of the way
courts nationwide have analyzed theories of liability to determine whether an oil company
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corporate franchising presented courts with relationships which appeared
to transcend the traditional notions of master and servant, and principal
and agent. 3 Injured plaintiffs argued that the defendant corporation
should be estopped from denying liability under the theory of apparent
agency,14 because it "represented" to the public that the franchisee was
its agent through the use of advertising and display of corporate
logos. 5
Initially, Florida courts were receptive to this argument.16 In
Economy Cabs, Inc. v. Kirkland," the Florida Supreme Court extended
the doctrine of apparent agency to the franchise context. 8 The plaintiff
in Economy Cabs brought suit against a cab company contending that
it was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence
of the driver of a cab which she believed the company owned. 9 The
cab company argued that the cab in question was independently owned
by a third party; therefore, the driver could not be considered its
employee.2'
The Economy Cabs court held that under these facts, the law will
presume as to the plaintiff, and the public generally, that the defendant
cab company operated the cabs which bore its name.2 ' The court
reasoned that corporations should not be permitted to "parade under a

should be liable for the torts of its service station operators, see Robert N. Davis, Jr., Comment,
Service Station Torts: Time for the Oil Companies to Assume Their Share of the Responsibility,
10 CAL. W. L. REv.382, 383-91, 396-401 (1974).
13. See generally Michael R. Flynn, Note, The Law of FranchisorVicarious Liability: A
Critique, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 89 (arguing that traditional agency principles are
fundamentally inappropriate as courts apply them to franchise relationships, and suggesting
possible alternatives to agency principles).
14. See supra note 3.
15. See David Brittan, Note, Franchisor'sLiability for Acts of Franchisees: A Risk
Administration Perspective, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 603, 610-11 (1980) (discussing the evolution
of plaintiffs theories of recovery from actual agency to apparent agency); supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
16. The theory of apparent agency was first adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in
1911. See T.G. Bush Grocery Co. v. Conely, 55 So. 867, 869 (Fla. 1911) (holding that where
a principal has voluntarily placed an agent in a situation in which a person of ordinary prudence
is justified in believing that the agent has authority to perform a particular act, and the person
relies on that belief in dealing with the agent, the principal is estopped from denying the agent's
authority).
17. 174 So. 222 (Fla. 1937).
18. See id. at 224.
19. Id. at 223. The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident involving a cab in
which she was a passenger. Id. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had telephoned the cab
company for a taxi. Id. The responding cab bore the insignia of Economy Cabs. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 224.
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flag of truce" to earn a profit and then deny liability for damages
inflicted.22 The court found that third parties who own taxicabs, but
operate them "in the name of the company at the call of the company
and under the colors of the company will be treated as the company. 2 3
Although the presumption enunciated by the Economy Cabs court
could have been logically extended to most franchise relationships,
courts were reluctant to do so in many situations. 4 Most notably, very
few recoveries were allowed in oil company cases because of what
commentators have referred to as the "common knowledge" doctrine.
Courts held that no one could reasonably believe that a service station
operator was the employee of the oil company because it was a matter
of common knowledge that the signs and the uniforms worn by
employees merely announced that the oil company's products were for
sale at the station.26
The Florida Second District Court of Appeal implicitly adopted the
common knowledge doctrine in Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co.27 In
Cawthon, the plaintiff brought suit against an oil company for injuries
that occurred in an accident after an employee at a service station
negligently repaired his automobile.28 The oil company argued that the
owner of the service station was an independent contractor, and that the
22. Id. The court also stated that "[o]ne of the first principles of hornbook law we were
taught in the law school was that for every wrong the law provides a remedy. If the law is to
be circumvented by litigants as proposed here, then we were taught a futile lesson." Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors' Liability When FranchiseesAre
Apparent Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of "Common Knowledge" About
Franchising,20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 639 n.112 (1992) (citing numerous cases which rejected
application of an apparent agency presumption and sent the issue to the jury).
25. See Emerson, supra note 24, at 645. The common knowledge doctrine was first
enunciated by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1939. See Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 287 N.W. 823
(Iowa 1939). The Reynolds court held that "[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that [oil
company signs] are displayed throughout the country by independent dealers." Id. at 827; see
also John F. Stuart, Comment, A Franchisor'sLiabilityfor the Torts of His Franchisee,5 U.S.F.
L. REV. 118, 130 (1970) (arguing that with "one sweeping generality," the Reynolds court
destroyed any possibility of recovering from a gasoline franchisor).
26. See, e.g., Reynolds, 287 N.W. at 827. But cf. Emerson, supra note 24, at 613 (citing
empirical evidence which suggests that the general population is in fact ignorant about
franchising and does not understand the basics about franchising law such as who owns and
operates the property).
27. See 124 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).
28. Id. at 518. The plaintiff's claims were based on theories of actual agency and apparent
agency. Id. at 519. The Cawthon court refused to recognize the claim of actual agency because
the plaintiff did not allege any control by the oil company over the franchisee service station.
Id. The plaintiff claimed that the oil company had created an apparent agency relationship with
the service station by advertising extensively in newspapers that it and its dealers provided
competent mechanics for automobile repairs. Id.
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signs and advertisements merely indicated that the station carried the oil
company's products for sale.29
On appeal, the Cawthon court held that in order for the theory of
apparent agency to apply, the injured party must not only have been
misled by the franchisor, but also must have relied on that misrepresentation to his detriment." The court found that service station signs and
advertisements only show that the oil company's products are sold at the
station, and not that the service station is an agent for the oil company
with respect to any standard of service or car repair.3 Thus, the court
found that it was unreasonable to assume that these advertisements
conferred upon the service station an apparent agency relationship with
the oil company.32
After Cawthon, the question remained whether Florida courts would
extend the common knowledge doctrine into other franchise situations,
or whether oil company cases were somehow different.33 Addressing
these and other issues in Orlando Executive Park v. Robbins,34 the
Florida Supreme Court adopted a three-prong test for apparent agency.35 The plaintiff in Orlando Executive Park was attacked by an
unidentified man while she was a guest at an independently owned
Howard Johnson's motel.36 Similar to the plaintiffs in Economy Cabs37
and Cawthon,38 she brought suit under an apparent agency theory.39

29. Id. at 518. The oil company's motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial
court. Id. at 519. The trial court premised its holding on the fact that the plaintiff did not allege
that the oil company controlled the methods of operation or the hiring of employees at the
service station, and that the plaintiff presented no evidence of actual or apparent agency which
would impose liability upon the oil company. Id.
30. Id. at 520 (citing Gulf Ref. Co. v. Wilkinson, 114 So. 503 (Fla. 1927)).
31. Id. at 521.
32. Id. In implicitly adopting the common knowledge doctrine, the Cawthon court clearly
held that a third party must reasonably rely on the franchisor's representations for an apparent
agency relationship to exist. Id. at 520; see also Sydenham v. Santiago, 392 So. 2d 357, 358
(Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (citing Cawthon for that proposition). However, the Cawthon court did not
specify the level of representation necessary to create an apparent agency relationship. See
Cawthon, 124 So. 2d at 521.
33. See Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 121 (noting that Orlando Executive Park appears to
create some distinction between oil company cases and others).
34. 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983).
35. See id. at 493-94.
36. Id. at 492.
37. Economy Cabs, 174 So. at 223.
38. Cawthon, 124 So. 2d at 518.
39. Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
The plaintiff claimed that the franchisor and franchisee owed her a legal duty to exercise
reasonable care for her safety while she was a guest on the premises. Id.
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Howard Johnson's principal argument was that it lacked any power
to control the franchisee.' Rejecting this argument, the Orlando
Executive Park court agreed with the district court's finding that while
Howard Johnson's control over the operation of the motel may be
relevant to a claim of actual agency, 4' it has no relevance to the theory
of apparent agency. 42 The OrlandoExecutive Park court held that three
elements are necessary to establish an apparent agency relationship: "(1)
a representation by the principal; (2) reliance on that representation by
a third person; and (3) a change of position by the third person in
reliance upon such representation to his detriment."43
The Orlando Executive Park court found that the district court had
set out the proper standard for analyzing the element of representation.44 The district court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence for
a jury to reasonably conclude that the uniformity of signs, building
design, and color scheme satisfied the element of representation because
they easily led persons to believe that each hotel was under common
ownership or conformed to common standards of service. 45 To the
extent Cawthon and other oil company cases suggested that signs and
advertising alone are never sufficient to create an apparent agency
relationship, the Orlando Executive Park court limited them to their
facts, and disapproved extending their language into other cases.4 6 In
affirming the decision of the district Court, 47 the Orlando Executive

40. Id. at 449.
41. Orlando Executive Park,433 So. 2d at 494. The Orlando Executive Park court found
that the district court set out the proper standard in finding that Howard Johnson's had
sufficiently represented the franchisee as its agent. Id. Implicit in this finding was the adoption
of the district court's analysis of Howard Johnson's defense of lack of control over the
franchisee. See id.
42. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 449.
43. Orlando Executive Park, 433 So. 2d at 494.
44. Id.
45. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 450. The district court distinguished Cawthon by stating that
signs do not make a gas station a general agent of the oil company because it is common
knowledge that gas station operators are independent contractors. Id. In addition to the evidence
pointed out by the district court, the OrlandoExecutive Park court noted that Howard Johnson's
direct participation was significant because it operated a restaurant, lounge, and adult theater in
the motel. Orlando Executive Park; 433 So. 2d at 494.
46. Orlando Executive Park, 433 So. 2d at 494.
47. Id. The Orlando Executive Park court also held that the district court correctly
analyzed the element of reliance. Id. The district court found that a jury could reasonably
conclude that the plaintiff believed exactly what Howard Johnson's wanted her to believe, that
she was dealing with Howard Johnson's, " 'a chain that sells a product across the nation.' "
P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 451. The district court also noted that the plaintiff telephoned a
specifically identified establishment that she had stayed at before, as opposed to just any motel.
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Parkcourt held that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily
a question for the jury, and that it can be proved by the facts on a caseby-case basis.48
The instant court retreated from the broad language espoused in
OrlandoExecutive Parkwhich suggested that advertising and display of
corporate logos alone can create an apparent agency.49 The instant court
stated that the only relevant fact in Orlando Executive Parkwas that the
franchisor actually operated several components within the motel.5 The
instant court found that this fact alone demonstrated to the public that
the franchisee was in substantial control of the premises." Adopting
the common knowledge doctrine, the instant court reasoned that in
today's world, it is well understood that the use of franchise logos or
other methods of advertising does not necessarily translate into actual
or apparent control by the franchisor over any substantial part of the
franchisee's business. 2
Disagreeing with the district court in Orlando Executive Park, the
instant court held that in order to create an agency relationship with a
franchisee, the franchisor must have apparently or directly participated
in managing or controlling the acts of the franchisee.53 In deciding that
petitioner lacked any power to control the franchisee, the instant court
found it important that the contract itself expressly stated that the
franchisee was an independent businessman and that nothing in the
contract was to be interpreted as creating a right in petitioner to exercise
control over the franchisee. 4
The instant court agreed with the OrlandoExecutive Park court that
the elements necessary to prove an apparent agency are that there has
been a representation by a purported principle; a third party has relied
on that representation; and the third party has changed position in
reliance on that representation. However, the instant court found that
respondent failed to allege the minimum level of representation
necessary to satisfy the first of these elements. 6 The instant court held
48. Orlando Executive Park, 433 So. 2d at 494 (citing Scott v. Sun Bank of Volusia
County, 408 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)).
49. See Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 121 (finding that the Orlando Executive Park language
was misleading and invited unnecessary confusion).
50. Id.; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 121.
52. Id. at 120.
53. Id. The Orlando Executive Park court adopted the district court's analysis of apparent
agency. Orlando Executive Park, 433 So. 2d at 494. The district court found that control had
no relevance to the theory of apparent agency. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 449.
54. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120-21.
55. See id. at 121.
56. Id.
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that respondent alleged no genuine representation by petitioner, but
merely assumed that such a representation was implicit in the use of
petitioner's products and symbols throughout the station. 7
In a strong dissent, Justice Shaw agreed with the majority that the
underlying issue in the instant case was whether petitioner had control
over the quality of customer service at the station. 8 However, Justice
Shaw found that service was a matter of extensive contractual agreement,59 pointing out that provisions in the contract required exemplary
customer service and were enforceable by petitioner.' Justice Shaw
also noted there was testimony that petitioner's representatives monitored the station regularly and were at times on the premises discussing
business operations.6 Justice Shaw would have affirmed the decision
of the district court because he found that the record contained vast
evidence supporting respondent's claims that an apparent agency
relationship existed, and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.'
Retreating from the principal holding espoused by the court only
twelve years earlier in OrlandoExecutive Park,63 the instant court held
that signs and logos alone are not sufficient to create an apparent agency
relationship.' Instead, the instant court examined the contract itself to

57. Id.
58. Id. at 123 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Shaw, J.,dissenting). The contract provided in relevant part: "'Buyer is an
independent businessman, and nothing in this contract shall be deemed as creating any right in
Seller to exercise any control over ... the conduct or management of Buyer's business, subject
only to Buyer's performance of the obligations imposed under this contract."' Id. (Shaw, J.,
dissenting) (second alteration in original). The obligations imposed under the contract included:
"Buyer agrees that while using any trademark, brand name, or other identification of Seller,
Buyer shall: (a) render prompt,fair, courteous, and efficient service to Buyer's customers; (b)
promptly investigate all customer complaints, and make such adjustments which are reasonable
and appropriate ...(d) provide qualified attendants to render good service to customers.
Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
60. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 122-23. (Shaw, J., dissenting) (noting that petitioner's representatives checked
on the station's pricing, appearance, and advertising).
62. Id. at 122 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Justice Shaw concluded that there was sufficient
evidence supporting respondent's claim that petitioner represented that the station was its agent.
Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting). Justice Shaw noted that petitioner owned the station and prominently
displayed its logos, trademarks, and color schemes to stimulate the station's business. Id. (Shaw,
J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Shaw found important the fact that the employees were
required to wear petitioner's uniforms and that the employee was wearing such a uniform when
he assaulted respondent. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
63. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
64. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 121; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-51
(explaining that advertising and displaying corporate logos alone cannot create apparent agency
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determine if petitioner had any power to control the franchisee.6' The
district court in OrlandoExecutive Park had flatly rejected this analysis,
holding
that control was not relevant to the theory of apparent agen66
cy.
Apparent agency is based on the "appearance" of an agency
relationship and is determined by representations made by the principal
to third parties. 7 Typical consumers who happen upon a business
franchise are not parties to the contract and therefore should not be
limited in their recovery by its terms. 8 Many consumers, in fact,
believe that when they visit local franchises they are patronizing large
national corporations which will stand behind their products and their
service.6 The Economy Cabs court boldly stated that a corporation
should not be permitted to "parade under a flag of truce" to earn a profit
and then deny liability for damages inflicted." That court found that
one of the fundamental principles of our legal system is that for every
wrong, the law affords a remedy."
Yet, by injecting notions of control into the law of apparent agency,
the instant court would seemingly refuse to allow any plaintiff to
recover from a franchisor who has represented to the public through
signs, logos, trademarks, and uniforms that another is his agent, but who
has, in fact, no contractual power to control the agent.72 Even if the
instant court would truly require some modicum of control, as Justice
Shaw points out in dissent, the contract itself did give petitioner the
power to exercise control over the franchisee.73 Petitioner had a
contractual right to enforce the provisions requiring the franchisee to
but operation of business components by the franchisor can).
65. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120-21.
66. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 449; see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text; see also
supra note 3 (discussing the differences between actual and apparent agency).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1957). For a description of this
Restatement section, see supra note 12.
68. See Dwight Golann et al., In Search of Deeper Pockets: Theories of Extended
Liability, 71 MASS. L. REv. 114, 128 (1986) (noting that courts have uniformly held that the
parties' description of the relationship is not determinative); see also Fruchter v. Lynch Oil Co.,
522 So. 2d 195, 200 (Miss. 1988) (holding that if a party offers its services to the public, and
customers are led to believe that they are dealing with that party, an undisclosed agreement may
not be used to defeat a plaintiff's action).
69. See Emerson, supra note 24, at 613 (citing empirical evidence which suggests that the
general population is in fact ignorant about franchising, and does not understand the basics about
franchising law, such as who owns and operates the property).
70. Economy Cabs, 174 So. at 224.
71. Id.
72. See Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120-21; supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
73. See Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 123 (Shaw, J., dissenting). For a summary of Justice
Shaw's dissenting opinion, see supra note 59.
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provide qualified attendants to render exemplary customer service.74
This appears to suggest that the instant court would require some level
of control beyond the mere ability to enforce the provisions of the
contract.
Adopting the common knowledge doctrine,75 the instant court held
that it is well known that the mere use of franchise trademarks and
advertisements does not necessarily indicate that the franchisor has
actual or apparent control over the franchisee's business.76 The
Cawthon court agreed with this basic assumption.77 Analyzing the
control issue as one of reliance, the Cawthon court held that it was
unreasonable for the plaintiff to assume that advertisements for the oil
company's products would confer any duty upon the principal to
maintain a certain standard of service at the station.7
The instant court could easily have decided this case by following
the reasoning of Cawthon and other oil company cases. Courts
throughout the nation have consistently and uniformly rejected extending
liability to oil companies for the torts of their franchisees.79 However,
by limiting itself to the issue of representation," the instant court was
required to either accept or reject the notion that the use of signs, logos,
and corporate uniforms could be sufficient to create an apparent agency
relationship. In rejecting the principal holding of Orlando Executive
Park,8 the instant court ignored not only common sense82 but also
explicit provisions in the contract which clearly indicated that petitioner

74. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 123 (Shaw, J., dissenting); see supra notes 59-60 and
accompanying text (providing relevant portions of the contractual language).
75. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
76. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120.
77. See Cawthon, 124 So. 2d at 521.
78. Id.; see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Wood v. Shell Oil Co., 495 So. 2d 1034, 1039 (Ala. 1986) (noting that the
majority of courts have refused to find an apparent agency relationship between a service station
operator and an oil company because it is common knowledge that service stations are owned
by independent dealers); Pitts v. Ivester, 320 S.E.2d 226, 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no
apparent agency where a service station employee threatened a customer with a gun); Sherman
v. Texas Co., 165 N.E.2d 916, 917 (Mass. 1960) (holding that the oil company's signs only
indicated that its gasoline products were sold at the station); Watkins v. Mobil Oil Corp., 352
S.E.2d 284, 287 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (reasoning that the plaintiff's claim of apparent agency
must fail because he patronized the service station on the basis of its proximity to his house and
not because of representations by the oil company).
80. See Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 121.
81. Id. The OrlandoExecutive Park court held that a franchisor is clearly representing to
the public that a certain level of service can be found there when it allows a franchisee to use
its uniform building design, color scheme, and logos. See Orlando Executive Park, 433 So. 2d
at 494; supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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was using these representations to distinguish its product and foster
public confidence in its service stations.83
Thus, rather than leaving a well-settled doctrine undisturbed, the
instant court chose to address Orlando Executive Park,finding that the
holding in that case was misleading and invited unnecessary confusion. 4 In so doing, however, the instant court may have made a
sweeping change to the doctrine of apparent agency in Florida. If the
holding of the instant case is extended beyond oil company cases and
into other franchise situations, the instant court may have eliminated
injured plaintiffs' most successful and potent argument." By examining
the terms of the contract, 6 the instant court would apparently allow a
franchisor to effectively absolve itself from liability by carefully drafting
provisions disclaiming any power to control the franchisee. This
outcome clearly would contradict the policy 7 behind the theory of
apparent agency by binding third party consumers to the terms of an
unfamiliar contract,88 and easily could lead to unconscionable results
in the future.

83. See Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 123 (Shaw, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 59-61
and accompanying text (discussing petitioner's role in the operation of the service station).
84. Bransford4 648 So. 2d at 121.
85. Generally, plaintiffs claim the existence of an apparent agency relationship rather than
an actual agency relationship because the control exerted by the franchisor over the franchisee
will not be deemed sufficient to support a claim of actual agency. See Randall K. Hanson, The
FranchisingDilemma: FranchisorLiabilityfor Actions of a Local Franchisee, 19 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 190, 198 (1991) (noting that there are an increasing number of cases which impose liability
upon franchisors under an apparent agency theory when the plaintiff cannot offer sufficient
evidence of control to support a finding of actual agency).
86. Bransford, 648 So. 2d at 120; see supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
87. The Economy Cabs court recognized the inherent unfairness in such situations, holding
that corporations who represent franchisees as their agents should be estopped from denying
liability for damages perpetrated, regardless of whether the corporation has any actual power or
control. See Economy Cabs, 174 So. at 224; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text
(explaining the reasoning of the Economy Cabs court).
88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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